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Faced with an angry electorate, the prospect of term limits, and a potential
third party full of disenchanted outsiders, political figures are renewing efforts
for electoral reform after a twenty-year hiatus. Chanting the mantra of change,
Bill Clinton won the presidency and pledged to restore the democratic
process.' Ross Pero sounded a call to "clean out the barn," and garnered more
support than any third party candidate has since Theodore Roosevelt.2 In 1992,
voters in fifteen states passed ballot initiatives to limit the terms of their
elected officials.3 Not since the post-Watergate period have the currents of
political discontent been so strong and the prospects for overhauling election
law so good. Nevertheless, today's reformers would do well to remember that
the effort to alter election law ends not in the legislative arena but in the
I. In his inaugural speech, President Clinton said, "To renew America we must revitalize our
democracy .... And, so I say to all of you here, let us resolve to reform our politics so that power and
privilege no longer shout down the voice of the people." The Inauguration; 'We Force the Spring':
Transcript of Address by President Clinton, N.Y. TMEs, Jan. 21, 1993, at AI5.
2. Perot won 19% of the popular vote in 1992 in comparison to 27% for Theodore Roosevelt in 1912.
John Anderson won only 7% in 1980. Steven A. Holmes, An Eccentric But No Joke; Perot's Strong
Showing Raises Questions on What Might Have Been, and What Might Be, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1992, at
Al.
3. Timothy Egan, House Speaker and Ex-Attorney General Dueling over Term Limits, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 29, 1993, at A16.
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courts, where judges have zealously guarded the First Amendment values
threatened by regulation of the political process.4
Congress should have learned this lesson after the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down its last attempt to rein in campaign financing in congressional
elections. In Buckley v. Valeo,5 the Court held that mandatory expenditure
limits on candidates for federal office violated the First Amendment. Prohibited
from directly capping campaign expenditures, Congress has now proposed
voluntary spending limits and plans to offer federal financial subsidies and
other incentives to candidates who adhere to those limits. The Senate has
passed such a version of campaign finance reform and is awaiting floor action
in the House of Representatives.
However, this reform strategy begs a fundamental question: Can Congress
do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly? In passing a bill that
benefits candidates who accept limits and penalizes those who do not,
Congress is arguably making a legislative end-run around the Supreme Court's
prohibition on mandatory spending limits. This approach directly implicates the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which holds that "government may not
grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional
right."7 Advocates for reform cannot resolve the constitutional difficulties this
doctrine poses simply by labelling the proposed limits "voluntary." To try to
do so would be to place in jeopardy the first major opportunity to improve the
congressional election system in nineteen years.
This Note scrutinizes the proposed legislation and argues that portions of
an aggressive campaign reform plan can survive application of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. Part I of the Note discusses the principles
articulated in Buckley when the Court reviewed Congress' last effort to
overhaul the electoral finance system. It also outlines the current campaign
reform plan and demonstrates how the plan's authors attempted to craft it
within Buckley's parameters. Part II describes the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions and its relevance for this election financing plan. Despite the
doctrine's precarious position in current jurisprudence, the Court's hostility to
4. Congress' first major attempt to restrict campaign finances came in 1907 with the passage of the
Tillman Act which prohibited corporate and banking contributions to federal candidates. A lower court
upheld the Act in United States v. United States Brewers Ass'n, 239 F. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916) (citing
government's interest in guarding elections from corruption).
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
6. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. In each session of Congress since the mid-1980's,
proposals have been pending that combine the use of federal subsidies and penalties to encourage
compliance with spending limits. When first introduced in the 103d Congress, the bills in the House and
Senate, HR-3 and S-3, were identical to the proposal approved by Congress in 1992 but vetoed by President
Bush. Federal Elections, Clinton Meets with Leaders to Urge Prompt Action on Campaign Finance Reform,
DAILY REP. FOR EXECuTnVES (BNA) No. 22, at D-33 (Feb. 4, 1993). The Senate later amended S-3
significantly by reducing benefits given to candidates who comply with the limits and increasing the
punishments for those who spend above the ceilings. See infra Part III. The House of Representatives has
yet to pass or fully consider HR-3.
7. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (1989).
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expenditure limitations might lead it to use the doctrine to invalidate the
reform bill. Part I first examines the similarities between the current
congressional proposal and the system for presidential election financing that
was approved in Buckley. It concludes that the congressional proposal is
voluntary, and thus constitutional, to the extent that it conforms to the
presidential system. Next, Part I identifies the plan's departures from the
presidential system, and analyzes whether each departure constitutes an offer
or a threat.' Where the plan uses threats, it is coercive and must satisfy the
strict-scrutiny test that applies to infringement of First Amendment rights. The
Note concludes that the program recently passed by the Senate is more
coercive than voluntary, and thereby imposes on the exercise of free speech by
candidates. However, if the Court can be convinced to recognize as a
compelling interest the public's confidence in the integrity of the democratic
system and to differentiate between free-speech rights at varying levels of
campaign spending, much (but not all) of the reform program, should still
survive scrutiny.
I. THE CoNSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY
As politicians vow to clean up Washington and reform legislation inches
toward final passage, the likelihood grows that the Court will soon be faced
with a case that asks it to do what reformers have longed for-revisit Buckley.
Since that 1976 decision, lawmakers seeking to control the cost of campaigns
have been severely constrained. Prevented from imposing mandatory limits,
reformers have proposed other ways to encourage candidates to reduce their
expenditures. These proposals involve dispensing benefits to candidates who
comply with statutory spending ceilings and levying penalties on those who do
not. A legal challenge to this strategy would enable the Court both to
reexamine the underpinnings of the Buckley decision and to assess the use of
government largesse to place pressure on constitutional rights.
A. The Federal Election Campaign Act and Buckley v. Valeo
The modem framework for campaign reform emerged in 1974, when
Congress passed a series of substantial amendments to the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).9 This ground-breaking initiative established
the Federal Election Commission to enforce a variety of new regulations,
including optional public financing for presidential campaigns, full disclosure
of all campaign contributions and expenditures, rigid contribution and
8. See infra Part ll.C. for an explanation of the theoretical framework used to distinguish between
offers and threats.
9. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974);
see also Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
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expenditure limits for all federal campaigns, and restrictions on contributions
from personal wealth. In short, the legislation constituted "by far the most
comprehensive, reform legislation passed by Congress concerning the election
of the President, the Vice-President and members of Congress."'
Immediately after FECA's passage, a diverse group of plaintiffs that
ranged from Republican Senator James Buckley of New York to liberal activist
Stewart Mott challenged the Act under expedited procedures as violating the
First and Fifth Amendments." The circuit court approved virtually the entire
bill, justifying spending restrictions on the basis that they were conduct-related
rather than speech-related and therefore subject to a lesser standard of First
Amendment review.12 However, after 294 pages and five separate opinions,
the Supreme Court "handed down an opinion ... that rewrote the rule book
for congressional and presidential campaign fundraising and spending, creating
a legal paradigm for reform that stands untouched seventeen years later." 3
Most important, the Court rejected the view that money spent in a campaign
could be separated from its speech component, stating: "[T]his Court has never
suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of
money operates itself to introduce a non-speech element or to reduce the
exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment."' 4 The Court refused to
treat expenditures as conduct analogous to burning a draft card 5 or the
spending limits as a form of time, place, or manner restriction.' 6 Either view
would have led the Court to apply a lesser standard of judicial scrutiny.
Rather, the Court stated:
[V]irtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass
society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the
humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation
costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and
publicizing the event. The electorate's increasing dependence on
television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has
10. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S.
1 (1976).
11. Other plaintiffs in this broad spectrum included Democratic presidential candidate Eugene
McCarthy, the Conservative Party of the State of New York, the New York Civil Liberties Union, and the
American Conservative Union. Id. at 833 n.1.
12. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 840 (applying conduct analysis established in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968)).
13. Beth Donovan, The Case that Wove the Intricate Web... of Campaign Finance Restrictions, 51
CONG. Q. 432 (1993).
14. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
15. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367 (holding that burning of draft card was conduct, not speech, and
therefore subject to criminal penalties).
16. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17-18. Time, place, and manner restrictions are a form of legislative
regulation traditionally more acceptable than content-based regulation. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S.
171, 177 (1983) (involving regulation of political displays on grounds of Supreme Court).
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made these expensive modes of communication indispensable
instruments of effective political speech.!7
As Justice White observed in dissent, the majority embraced the maxim that
"money talks" without reservation or serious analysis, thereby simply equating
money with speech in the political context.18 Rejecting arguments for lesser
scrutiny, the Court concluded that the FECA restrictions operated "in an area
of the most fundamental First Amendment activities."'19
The Court essentially rewrote the Act by ruling selectively on various of
its components. In an important victory for the reform plan, the Court held that
contribution limits were justified by the Act's "primary purpose" of avoiding
corruption.20 This victory was undermined, however, by the Court's
invalidation of spending limits, a reform lying at the heart of the program. In
making the distinction between contributions and expenditures, the Court
established a dichotomy that has since governed campaign-finance regulation
though it continues to be assailed by legal scholars and political observers.2 '
The distinction depended on two highly problematic conclusions. First, the
Court understood the corruption risk solely in terms of the threat of quid pro
quo corruption-dollars given in return for political favors. Large contributions
heightened this risk while unrestrained expenditures did not. In limiting its
conception of corruption to the quid pro quo variety, the Court ignored the role
excessive campaign spending plays in compromising the electorate's
confidence in the democratic process. 22 By restraining contributions while
allowing overall expenditures to soar, the Court's decision spawned a money
chase that requires constant fundraising and continued reliance on wealthy
donors. A broader corruption theory would have recognized the dangers
inherent in a process where election outcomes depend on which candidate has
access to the most money.
Second, the Court also distinguished between contribution and expenditure
regulations on the basis of their impact on rights protected by the First
17. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 262-66.
19. Id. at 14.
20. Id. at 26-27.
21. One recent critique states that "the distinction between expenditures and contributions has been
so severely criticized that it may no longer support a different level of scrutiny for contributions than for
expenditures." Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign
Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1063 (1985); see also Archibald Cox, Foreword: Freedom of
Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 55-73 (1980) (discussing elusive quality of
contribution/expenditure distinction). Justice Marshall reversed his position on the contribution/expenditure
distinction in Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,
520-21 (1985) ("I disagree that the limitations on contributions and expenditures have significantly different
impacts on First Amendment freedoms. . . . In summary, I am now unpersuaded by the distinction
established in Buckley.").
22. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 ("[Ihe mere growth in the cost of federal election campaigns in and of
itself provides no basis for governmental restrictions on the quantity of campaign spending .... ).
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Amendment. The Court held that expenditure limits infringed free speech more
significantly than contribution limits did. The Court stated:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed,
the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.
. . . The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent
substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and
diversity of political speech.23
On the other hand, the Court employed a vague, almost metaphysical,
argument to defend the free-speech ramifications of contribution limits. The
Court stated:
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the
candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying
basis for support. The quantity of communication by the contributor
does not increase perceptibly with the size of the contribution, since
the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of
contributing.24
This distinction between free speech harms does not hold up to close analysis.
Preventing a donor who is passionately committed to a candidate from
contributing to that candidate creates a very significant speech burden. Because
the contribution limit hinders the contributor's ability to express the extent of
his or her support, the ceiling hampers expressive potential. Furthermore,
where the above-ceiling contribution could launch a candidacy that otherwise
would fail, the contribution limit prevents the donor's views, or the
candidate's, from being heard at all. On the other hand, the speech harm from
an expenditure limit is slight when a candidate who has already purchased $5.5
million in advertisements is merely prevented from adding another campaign
employee to his or her staff.
While disallowing mandatory spending limits in congressional races as
violative of First Amendment rights, the Court approved voluntary spending
limits in the presidential system. Providing no rationale for distinguishing
between these two situations, the Court accepted a regime where major-party
presidential candidates could each receive $20,000,000 in subsidies if they
agreed not to raise and spend private funds?5 In short, the government could
23. Id. at 19.
24. Id. at 21.
25. Id. at 85-90. This figure is tied to the rate of inflation and increases for every election. In the 1992
election cycle, Bill Clinton and George Bush each received $73 million in the general election. John W.
Mashek, 1996 Election Fund May Run Short as Only 19% of Taxpayers Check Off, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
15, 1992, at 10.
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bribe presidential candidates to cap spending, but it could not compel
congressional candidates to do so. Rather than explain the constitutional
significance of the distinction between voluntary and mandatory limits, the
Court only addressed the equal protection objections raised by minor parties
who argued unsuccessfully that the system disadvantaged them.
B. The Legislative Response to Buckley
The Buckley decision casts a long shadow over congressional efforts to
revamp campaign finance laws. While some lawmakers have advocated a
direct assault on Buckley, 6 Congress has mainly sought to effectuate the type
of reforms disallowed by the Court within the Buckley framework. Most
important, reformers have clung to the objective of establishing expenditure
ceilings, in some form, on electoral spending despite the Court's clear
pronouncement that mandatory spending limits violate the First Amendment.27
A principal reason for this continued demand for reform is the spiralling cost
of campaigns, a cost which has risen over more than 300% since 1980.28 On
average, a successful candidate for the Senate, for example, raises more than
$4 million in a six-year term. In other words, an incumbent Senator must raise
more than $12,000 each week throughout a six-year election cycle.29 In the
House of Representatives, a candidate in a contested race faces a burden of
raising approximately $4,000 each week for a total of $400,000 in a two-year
term.30 To reduce the role of money in politics within the framework of
Buckley, Congress has proposed "voluntary" expenditure limits. Congress
would offer financial benefits to induce compliance with the limits, as well as
penalties to discourage noncompliance. This approach was approved by both
26. In the 103d Congress, Senators Ernest F Hollings (D-S.C.) and Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), both of
whom narrowly won reelection in 1992 after expensive races, introduced a joint resolution, SJ. Res. 10,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), calling for a constitutional amendment to allow Congress and state legislators
to set spending limits. Similar legislation has been introduced in the House of Representatives by
Representative John Dingell (D-Mich.). H.RJ. Res. 20, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). While the
constitutional amendment to overrule Buckley has been proposed before, it has never gained the requisite
nation-wide momentum. However, the Senate recently passed by a 52-43 margin a resolution expressing
its support for a constitutional amendment allowing reasonable limits on congressional campaign
expenditures. 51 CONG. Q. 1389 (1993) (Vote no. 129).
27. On the opening day of the 1993 legislative session, the Democratic leadership renewed its
commitment to spending limits, calling them the central feature of its electoral reform package. Rules
Committee Chairman Wendell Ford (D-Ky.) stated, "[I]n past debates, I have said there can be no real
reform without meaningful spending limits. I believe that the terms of these spending limits remain
negotiable. But the issue of whether to establish spending limits is not." 139 CONG. REC. S241 (daily ed.
Jan. 22, 1993).
28. Ellen Miller, Executive Director of the Center for Responsive Politics, Remarks at the Consultation
on Buckley v. Valeo 3 (Apr. 19, 1993 at National Press Club in Washington, D.C.) (transcript on file with
Center for Responsive Politics, Washington, D.C.) (analysis based on reports filed with the Federal Election
Commission).
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the House and Senate in 1992, but President Bush vetoed the proposal, and
Congress failed to override him in a vote that fell largely along party lines.3
As the 103d Congress first convened, Democratic leaders in the Senate
introduced a bill essentially identical to the conference report approved by the
previous Congress in the hope that newly elected President Clinton would sign
the measure into law.32 The bill's numerical title, Senate Bill #3 (hereinafter
S-3), denotes its high priority on the congressional agenda.33 In the House,
an identical companion bill, House Resolution #3 (hereinafter HR-3), was
introduced. 34 As originally proposed, the Senate and House bills in part
31. Guy Gugiotta, Veto of Campaign Finance Reform Bill Upheld; 57-42 Senate Vote Falls Well Short,
Reaffirming Partisan Stalemate, WASH. POST, May 14, 1992, at A12.
32. S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 139 CONG. REc. S225-240 (daily ed. Jan. 21,
1993) (as originally proposed) (hereinafter S. 3 as Proposed). Chief sponsors of the bill include its author,
Senator David Boren (D-Okla.), Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-Me.), and Senate Rules
Committee Chairman Wendell Ford (D-Ky.). Democrats were buoyed by President Clinton's campaign
remarks that he would have signed the bill vetoed by President Bush as well as by remarks during the
previous day's inaugural address in which the President called for reform of election laws. Id. at S224. A
one-page memorandum from the Clinton-Gore campaign outlined a bill very similar to the congressional
plan, with voluntary spending caps for House and Senate candidates. Tim Curran, If Bill Clinton Wins,
Campaign Reform Will Follow Soon After; But Do Democrats Want Sweeping Changes?, ROLL CALL, Sept.
14, 1992, at 34.
33. See 139 CONG. REC. S224 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993) (statement of Sen. Boren). For a descriptive
summary of the bill's provisions, see Beth Donovan, Campaign Finance Bill, 50 CONG. Q. 1651 (1992),
which describes the measure when it was approved in June 1992. In its original form, and as approved by
the Senate Rules Committee in March 1993, the bill provided public funding at the outset of the campaign
for candidates complying with spending limits in addition to extra funds when an opponent exceeds
voluntary limits. The bill also dealt, when proposed, with both House and Senate elections.
The original bill proposed to cap spending on races for the House of Representatives at $600,000.
S. 3 as Proposed, supra note 32, see. 121, § 601. According to the bill, if the candidate agreed to spending
limits and successfully raised through private donations $60,000 in payments of $250 or less, she would
be eligible for $200,000 in matching funds. Id. § 604(a)-(c). Complying candidates could also mail up to
one piece of mail per eligible voter at the lowest third-class nonprofit rate. Id. at sec. 132 (amending 39
U.S.C. 3626(e)). Contingency money in the form of matching funds and allowances for additional private
fundraising would be provided to complying candidates once non-participating candidates violated the
voluntary spending limits. Id. at sec. 121, § 601(d); Donovan, supra, at 1652.
The bill established voluntary spending limits for the Senate that range from $635,000 to
approximately $8.9 million depending on the voting-age population of the state and on whether the
candidate faced both a primary and general election opponent. S. 3 as Proposed, supra note 32, see. 101,
§§ 501-502; Donovan, supra, at 1652. To be eligible, the Senate candidate would have to agree to the
spending limit and raise the lesser of $250,000 or 10% of the spending limit from small contributions of
$250 or less, half of which must come from the candidate's home state. S. 3 as Proposed, supra note 32,
sec. 101, § 501(e). A noncomplying candidate would be forced to run a disclaimer on her advertising
indicating that she did not abide by voluntary spending limits. Id. at sec. 104. Complying candidates would
receive an array of benefits, including communication vouchers worth 20% of the spending limit that could
be used to buy advertisements. Id. at sec. 101, § 503(a)-(c). Participating candidates would also receive
allowances for one piece of mail per eligible voter at the lowest third class-nonprofit rate and 50%
broadcasting discount rates for the general election period and the last days of a primary. Id. §§ 131-132
(amending 47 U.S.C. 315(b) and 39 U.S.C. 3626(e)). Once a noncomplying candidate exceeded the
spending limit, the participating candidate would receive contingency funds to match the opponent's
excessive spending. Id. at sec. 101, § 503(b)(3).
34. H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Congress approved the reforms in this bill in 1992, and
Representative Sam Gejdenson (D-Conn.) reintroduced the legislation as H.R. 3 this year since the proposal
never became law. Because the House Bill is the same as the final campaign reform bill passed by both
houses of Congress in 1992, the legislation deals with both House and Senate elections. In contrast, the
recently passed Senate Bill only addresses Senate elections. The Senate will await passage of a House bill
addressing House elections before convening a House-Senate conference committee to combine the two
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tracked the presidential system, providing automatic public financing for those
who limited campaign expenditures. The main innovation of the congressional
plan was that additional benefits would flow to the complying candidate once
an opponent surpassed the spending limits?3
In light of new support in the White House, most observers believed
Congress would quickly approve campaign reform. In fact, the bill's progress
has been less than impressive, probably because lawmakers now realize their
plan will likely be signed into law and are therefore far more cautious. After
a long filibuster, the Senate was able to pass a scaled-down version of S-3 on
June 17, 1993. In its current form, S-3 no longer provides funds to all
complying candidates. Instead, it gives out "triggered" public funds (in the
form of advertising vouchers and postage discounts) only when a
noncomplying opponent exceeds the spending limit.36 These vouchers are to
be paid for by removing the current tax exemption for campaigns and imposing
a tax of the highest corporate rate (thirty-four percent at time of passage) on
those campaigns that do not abide by spending limits.3 7 These changes
lowered S-3's costs by eliminating automatic public financing for complying
candidates. No action has taken place in the House, where the main vehicle
remains HR-3, a replica of the bill approved in the 102d Congress.
While reformers are guardedly optimistic about prospects for the first
major overhaul of electoral law since the 1974 FECA amendments, their critics
are preparing a widely anticipated court challenge under the Buckley precedent.
The plan's most vigorous opponent, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), has
indicated that he is already forming a litigation group to challenge the
proposal. He has said, "We fully expect to be in the court before the end of
the year if this bill passes., 38 Referring to the 1976 plaintiff in Buckley,
McConnell boasted that "I'll be the Jim Buckley of 1993," and noted that
"there is a chance that if this matter goes to this Supreme Court, they could
disallow any spending limits. This is a very different Court., 39 Since S-3
provides that any court ruling addressing its constitutionality can be appealed
directly to the Supreme Court, the high court could soon be faced with a
momentous campaign reform dispute.
40
bills into a comprehensive congressional campaign finance law. Typically, each body defers to the other
in regulating their respective campaigns. As this Note goes to press, the House has not begun floor debate
on campaign finance reform.
35. Id. at sec. 121, § 601; S. 3 as Proposed, supra note 32, see. 101, § 503 (1993).
36. Infra Part III.B.1.
37. Id.
38. Tim Curran, This lime Around, It's for Real, ROLL CALL, Jan. 18, 1993, at 15.
39. Curran, supra note 32, at 35.
40. S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 804 (1993), reprinted in 139 CONG. REC. S7444, S7452 (daily ed.
June 17, 1993) (as passed by Senate) (hereinafter S. 3 as Passed). Section 804 of the bill states that an
appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court from any interlocutory order or final judgment, decree,
or order issued by any court ruling on the constitutionality of any provision in the Act. It further requires
the Court to accept jurisdiction over the appeal, advance it on the docket, and expedite it to the greatest
extent possible.
1993]
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II. THE DoCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDMONS
The trend in the Court's opinions since Buckley does not bode well for the
legislation. In all but a few cases, the Court has been hostile to regulations in
the political sector.4' The sharp rhetoric of the Court's conservatives leaves
little doubt that they look with suspicion on efforts to equalize the power of
speakers in the political forum. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce,42 Justice Scalia vigorously dissented from Justice Marshall's
majority decision upholding prohibitions on corporate use of general treasury
funds for independent expenditures on behalf of candidates in state elections.
Scalia wrote:
"Attention all citizens. To assure the fairness of elections by
preventing disproportionate expression of the views of any single
powerful group, your Government has decided that the following
associations of persons shall be prohibited from speaking or writing
in support of any candidate: " In permitting Michigan to make
private corporations the first object of this ORWELLIAN announcement,
the Court today endorses the principle that too much speech is an evil
that the democratic majority can proscribe.
43
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor branded the majority a "censor" and said the
result "reveals a lack of concern for speech rights that have the full protection
of the First Amendment."" Nor can reformers necessarily rely on the more
liberal members of the Court. Justice Stevens joined the majority in Buckley
and has shown no willingness to undermine its basic conclusions. Justice
Blackmun dissented in Buckley on the grounds that both contribution and
expenditure limits should be held unconstitutional. And, most significant,
Congress has lost a strong ally in Justice White, a dissenter in Buckley and an
ardent protector of Congress' campaign reform prerogatives.
Although political opponents have not yet couched the argument in formal
legal terms, they will undoubtedly invoke the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions.45 This doctrine posits that government may not grant a benefit on
the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the
41. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480
(1985) (striking down statutory restrictions on political action committee expenditures in presidential
campaigns); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down Massachusetts law prohibiting
corporate expenditures in statewide referendum).
42. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
43. Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 713 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
45. For discussions of this doctrine, see Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Seth F Kreimer, Allocational
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, supra note 7; Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an
Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv. 593 (1990).
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government may withhold that benefit altogether. Not found in the text of the
constitution itself, this doctrine is a logical inference from that text, the
creation of judicial implication.46 As campaign reform marches through
Congress, it is critical to assess the doctrine's relevance today and to highlight
the underlying concepts that animate the theory. In this era of governmental
largesse, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions serves as a much needed
constraint on government power. It should not work, however, as a total bar
to the government's objectives. When the condition infringes a fundamental
right, it should be allowed as a legitimate use of government power if it is
narrowly tailored to an objective of compelling importance. This "compelling
interest" analysis is nothing more than the strict scrutiny courts apply whenever
they face legislation restricting a protected liberty, such as restrictions on free
speech in the electoral arena.
A. The Competing Views of the Doctrine
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prevents those who control the
public fisc from using that power to extract objectionable waivers of
constitutional rights. Recently, the Court has wrestled with problems posed by
unconstitutional conditions in several contexts. They include President Bush's
promulgation of regulations that prohibit recipients of Title X funds from
engaging in activities advocating abortion,47 the federal government's attempt
to induce states to cede police powers in return for federal highway funds, 8
and Congress' prohibition on the use of federal funds for editorializing on
public television.49 In this tradition, opponents of campaign reform argue that
if Buckley prohibits the government from placing a mandatory limit on
candidate spending, it prohibits the government from conditioning the receipt
of federal subsidies upon the waiver of the right to spend privately raised
donations freely.50 These opponents argue that the reform plan makes
candidates an offer they cannot refuse, and thereby coerces them into ceding
their constitutional rights.
The doctrine's origins can be traced to the 1920's, when states tried to
condition corporate activity within their borders on such concessions as an
agreement by the corporation not to invoke the authority of federal courts on
46. See Epstein, supra note 45, at 10-11. Epstein likens the doctrine to "Banquo's ghost" appearing
infrequently but persistently throughout constitutional law.
47. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
48. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
49. Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
50. Senator McConnell stated the objection more bluntly in response to a question concerning the
impact of voluntary spending limits: "[Tihere's nothing voluntary about these spending limits. In fact, they
are mandatory. They're like a hammer. If you were so audacious as to want to speak too much ... all
kinds of bad things happen to you." McNeil-Lehrer News Hour, (P.B.S. television broadcast, May 7, 1993),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
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diversity jurisdiction. True to the Lochner-era ethos of economic rights, the
Court deployed the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to invalidate these
efforts as improper pressure on fundamental rights.5
Just as the doctrine played a significant role in the Lochner era to protect
the economic liberties of corporations, it enjoyed a renaissance during the
Warren Court as a mechanism to protect constitutional liberties, especially free
speech. 2 In Perry v. Sindermann,53 for example, the Court permitted a
professor to claim that his First Amendment rights were infringed when he was
denied tenure after criticizing the state university. Justice Stewart seemed to
accord special status to the First Amendment when evaluating the
constitutionality of how benefits are allocated. He wrote:
[The government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his
interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a
benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or
associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be
penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to "produce
a result which [it] could not command directly.
' 54
The Perry decision relied heavily on Justice Brennan's opinion in Speiser v.
Randall,55 where the Court held that tax exemptions to veterans could not be
conditioned upon the taking of a loyalty oath because that condition amounted
to a penalty for their ideas. The Court in Speiser stated:
It cannot be gainsaid that a discriminatory denial of a tax exemption
for engaging in speech is a limitation on free speech.... So here, the
denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily
will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the
proscribed speech.
56
Those who dismiss the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions often argue
that the government's power to grant a benefit includes the lesser power to
restrict that benefit as it chooses. The power to condition benefits upon the
waiver of a constitutional protection is deduced from the power to grant the
benefit in the first place." As paradigmatic of this position, commentators
51. See Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922) (holding unconstitutional state law revoking
license of foreign corporations that resort to federal courts); see also Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R.
Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) (holding that private carrier's use of state highway does not entitle state to
require carrier to assume all burdens typically assumed by common carriers).
52. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 1416.
53. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
54. Id. at 597 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
55. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
56. Id. at 518.
57. Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595, 1595-96 (1960).
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point to Justice Holmes' opinion in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford.58
McAuliffe involved a policeman who had been fired for violating a regulation
prohibiting political affiliation for public employees. Justice Holmes wrote,
"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman. ' 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist has adopted
Holmes' approach to state power and his hostility to the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
Co. of Puerto Rico, 60 the Court held that the state may require a gambling
operation to forfeit some of its First Amendment rights since the state had the
authority to permit gambling in the first instance. Justice Rehnquist wrote that
"it is precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale
prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government
to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand
through restrictions on advertising.
' 61
Commenting on Justice Holmes' analysis, Judge Patricia Wald has called
the reasoning "stunningly unresponsive. ' 62 Holmes failed to recognize that the
petitioner's claim was not that the regulation prevented him from being a
police officer but that it severely restrained his ability to exercise his First
Amendment rights. As Judge Wald noted, the greater-includes-the-lesser
argument requires a second premise to be accepted, namely that an
unconstitutional infringement of speech occurs only if the sanction for
exercising free speech is the deprivation of some other constitutionally
protected liberty. Yet there is a fundamental fallacy in the notion that the
power to condition is a lesser power. Equal protection theory since the 1950's
has recognized that discrimination in the disbursement of a public benefit is
a potent and frequently invidious use of government power.63 While the state
might be constitutionally authorized to regulate casino advertising, particularly
because it is commercial speech, the argument made by the Chief Justice in
Posadas presents serious constitutional difficulties since the same argument
could be made, for instance, to allow a state legislature to dock pay from
casino employees engaged in union or other political activities.
58. 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
59. Id. at 517.
60. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
61. Id. at 346 (emphasis omitted). See also Justice O'Connor's dissent in Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission v. Mississippi, where she criticizes the majority's reliance on the "greater-includes-the-lesser"
contention since it would dissolve all constitutional limits on federal regulation of state action. 456 U.S.
742, 785-87 (1982).
62. Patricia Wald, Government Benefits: A New Look at an Old Gifthorse, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 247,
251 (1990).
63. Imagine a decision to deny welfare benefits to all opponents of the war in the Persian Gulf, or to
restrict drivers' licenses to those adhering to a particular religious faith.
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B. Unconstitutional Conditions after Rust v. Sullivan
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions teeters precariously since the
Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan.64 In Rust, Chief Justice Rehnquist
brushed aside that doctrine in upholding regulations promulgated by the
Department of Health and Human Services prohibiting the use of Title X
funding for abortion counseling, referral, and activities advocating abortion as
a method of family planning. Recipients of family-planning funds argued
unsuccessfully that the regulation violated the First Amendment in two ways.
First, they contended that the regulations imposed impermissible viewpoint-
discriminatory conditions on government subsidies. 65 Second, they argued that
the regulations conditioned receipt of the benefit of Title X funding on the
relinquishment of constitutionally protected rights of abortion advocacy and
counseling.66 The Court disagreed.
Although Rust signalled a retreat from the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, the decision did not completely abandon the doctrine in the First
Amendment context, and the doctrine may return to haunt campaign reformers.
Chief Justice Rehnquist took an important step to distinguish Rust from other
cases holding that the government may not deny a benefit on a basis that
infringes free speech. Rehnquist carved out an expansive exception to the
Court's approval of conditioned benefits, finding certain arenas where
Congress could not regulate funding in conjunction with restrictions on speech.
He wrote, "[This Court has recognized that the existence of a Government
'subsidy' ... does not justify the restriction of speech in areas that have 'been
traditionally open to the public for expressive activity."' 67 This exception
provides room for the Court to maneuver if and when it is asked to pass
judgment on a federal election regulatory scheme, since it allows the Court to
conclude that an election campaign, like a university, should be subject to the
highest level of scrutiny.
The doctrine's revival in the electoral arena seems more likely in light of
Rehnquist's opinion in Pacific Gas & Electric,68 where he revisited the
distinction the Court made in Buckley between contribution and expenditure
limitations. Whereas the Buckley court had stressed that contributions could
be regulated because of their close relationship to corruption, Rehnquist argued
that the distinction owed more to the heightened speech value of expenditures
64. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). The so-called "gag rule" upheld by the Court in Rust was subsequently
rescinded in the opening days of the Clinton Administration. Memorandum on the Title X "Gag Rule," 29
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 87 (Jan. 22, 1993).
65. 111 S. Ct. at 1771-72.
66. Id. at 1773-74.
67. Id. at 1776 (citing United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3119 (1990)). Interestingly, the
doctor-patient relationship did not constitute one of these special areas.
68. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1985).
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per se.69 Therefore, the analysis in Rust and Pacific Gas & Electric indicates
that the Court is prepared to use the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in
specific arenas traditionally open for public expression to invalidate contingent
benefits. It is reasonable to assume that expenditures in an election contest
would be included in this category.
C. Two Tests for Contingent Benefits: Coercion and Connection to
Government Interest
The Warren Court protected constitutional liberties by applying the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to strike down laws that infringed the
freedom of speech. But the Court provided little explicit discussion to guide
its implementation. While coercion emerges as a central issue in both
Speiser7° and Perry,71 it is extremely difficult to distinguish between a
penalty for noncompliance with a government program on the one hand, and
a bonus for participdtion on the other. In Seth Kreimer's seminal work on the
theory of unconstitutional conditions, he proposes an analytical framework for
courts to use in making a threshold distinction between offers and threats. 2
Threats are allocations that make an actor worse off than she would have been
had she not exercised her constitutional rights.73 Threats are coercive in that
the actor must comply with them or suffer a loss. Offers, on the other hand,
leave the actor in a better position by expanding the options available.74
Offers, while often persuasive, are not coercive because they have no negative
effect if not accepted.75 A statute, for example, that took away welfare from
a woman who obtained an abortion would constitute a threat, while a state's
decision to pay money to a woman who puts her child up for adoption would
reflect an offer.
Implicit in the case law are two tests used to evaluate the constitutionality
of conditioned benefits. First, the courts try to distinguish between programs
that represent offers to induce waiver of constitutional rights and those that use
threats to coerce waiver. Offers are largely acceptable, but threats are subject
69. 475 U.S. at 29 n.2. While contribution limits involve "indirect and minimal effect on First
Amendment interests," Justice Rehnquist distinguished expenditure limits, writing that "the relatively greater
effect of these limitations on affirmative speech triggered heightened scrutiny, and a rational basis was no
longer sufficient to justify them." Id.
70. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
71. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
72. Kreimer, supra note 45, at 1351-59.
73. Id. at 1300-01.
74. Id.
75. Although offers might not pose problems of coercion, some types of offers may be considered
impermissible. For instance, the government arguably should not be allowed to make offers where an
inalienable right is involved, such as the Thirteenth Amendment right not to be sold into slavery and the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 1307-08.
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to strict scrutiny to determine whether the condition is narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling government interest.
1. Voluntary Offer or Coercive Threat
In Rust, the opinion emphasized the fact that "[t]he employees remain
free, however, to pursue abortion-related activities when they are not acting
under the auspices of the Title X project. 76 Regardless of whether employees
in fact remained free to engage in abortion counseling, this statement reflects
the Court's ostensible concern about whether the program was coercive.
Because the plaintiffs allegedly possessed the same degree of freedom after the
agency promulgated the rules, the Court maintained that coercion was not a
problem. Similarly, the absence of coercion was the determinative factor for
Justice Scalia in his dissent in Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, where he
argued in favor of upholding the denial of a tax exemption to a certain class
of publications.77 He stated:
The reason that denial of participation in a tax exemption or other
subsidy scheme does not necessarily "infringe" a fundamental right is
that-unlike a direct restriction or prohibition-such a denial does
not, as a general rule, have any significant coercive effect. It may, of
course, be manipulated so as to do so, in which case the courts will
be available to provide relief.
78
Although he acknowledged that manipulation could turn a tax exemption into
a coercive device, Scalia distinguished such a situation from the one at hand
by pointing out that the exemption policy did not hinder the magazine. He
stated: "It is implausible that the 4% sales tax, generally applicable to all sales
in the State with the few enumerated exceptions, was meant to inhibit, or had
the effect of inhibiting, this appellant's publication." 79 Because, in his view,
the magazine had not been penalized, Scalia did not see a problem presented
by the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Unless such a distinction was
made, Scalia wrote, the Court would cast into doubt all preferences and
subsidies relating to the First Amendment that make distinctions based on
subject matter."°
76. Rust v. Sullivan, 11I S. Ct. 1759, 1775 (1991).
77. 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 237.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 238.
[Vol. 103: 469
Buckley v. Valeo
2. Strict Scrutiny for Threats
When a program uses threats to induce compliance, the program should be
subjected to the same heightened scrutiny as a sanction for exercising that
right. First, a condition burdening a fundamental right must be justified by a
compelling state interest." Second, proper and improper state pressure must
be distinguished by assessing the fit between the condition and the policy
objective sought. 82 An overly broad condition is more likely aimed at
curtailing a right than at realizing a legitimate government objective. In Regan
v. Taxation With Representation,83 the Court allowed Congress to deny
nonprofit organizations tax benefits for their lobbying activities in accordance
with the objective of not subsidizing lobbying activities. Three justices
concurred on the basis that the nonprofit organizations did not lose the tax
benefits for their nonlobbying activities, and they were still free to make
known their views without penalty on legislation through affiliate
organizations. 84 Because of the close connection between Congress' desire to
ensure that tax-deductible contributions not be used for lobbying and the
removal of the tax benefit only for lobbying activities, the Court accepted the
rationale offered by Congress and did not reject the provision as an effort to
quash speech rights.
The Court extended this logic in FCC v. League of Women Voters85 by
striking down a regulation that prohibited publicly funded television stations
receiving grants from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting from engaging
in editorializing. The Court found that, unlike the statute in Taxation with
Representation, the condition was only loosely connected to the objective of
not subsidizing televised editorials with public funds. Had the law prohibited
only the use of public funds and contained a mechanism for public television
stations to use private funds for editorializing, the Court would have allowed
this more narrowly-tailored limitation on First Amendment rights. In Rust,
Justice Rehnquist tried to turn League of Women Voters to his advantage,
pointing out that the federal law in League of Women Voters banned all
editorializing and failed to distinguish between editorializing financed by
public and by private funds, whereas the rule at issue in Rust permitted a Title
X grantee to engage in abortion activity using private funds separately from
81. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (stating that "where a prohibition
is directed at speech itself and the speech is directly related to the process of governing, 'the state may
prevail only upon showing a subordinate interest which is compelling."' (quoting Baker v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960))); see also Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F.
Supp. 280, 284-85, aff'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
82. In the First Amendment context, the Court requires the government to "employ means 'closely
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement.' Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
83. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
84. Id. at 552-53 (Blackmun, J. concurring).
85. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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the project. Essentially, Rehnquist applied an overbreadth analysis and found
the Rust rule satisfactory. Similarly, in Harris v. McRae,86 the Court said it
would have disallowed withholding of all Medicaid benefits for abortion
seekers even though it did permit denial of benefits for abortions. The denial
of benefits for abortion procedures alone was narrowly tailored to the state's
anti-abortion objectives, but a total restriction of welfare would have been
invalidated as an effort to coerce sacrifice of a constitutional liberty, the right
to an abortion.
I. S-3 AS AN UNCONSTTUTIONAL CONDMON?
A constitutional challenge to S-3 would present the Court squarely with
an opportunity to synthesize its previous decisions on the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. In doing so, the Court should assess whether the
campaign reform proposal coerces candidates to sacrifice their protected free-
speech rights and, if so, whether its coercive provisions are closely related to
compelling state interests.
If the legislation in its final form adheres to the presidential model of
campaign financing,87 providing automatic subsidies for compliance, it should
be treated as an offer and held to be constitutional. To the extent that the
legislation departs from the presidential model, however, relying more on
punitive mechanisms such as triggered subsidies, the provisions become harder
to classify as offers rather than threats and become subject to the Court's strict
scrutiny analysis.
In determining the acceptable framework for distinguishing offers from
threats, the approach developed by Seth Kreimer is an effective starting place.
A bargain is an offer if, by refusing it, potential recipients are made no worse
off than they would have been if the program had never existed; it is a threat
if, by refusing it, they are made worse off. This distinction between offers and
threats is easiest to apply in analyzing bargains between the government and
an isolated individual. It is more difficult to apply in the competitive
atmosphere of a political campaign, where a benefit to one candidate means
a loss for another. What appears simply to be an offer to a complying
candidate may actually be a threat to a noncomplying candidate. To the extent
that a candidate's exercise of free-speech rights is considered noncompliance,
and noncompliance results in the candidate being placed in a worse position,
the program is coercive and runs head-on into the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. Such a program should be rigorously evaluated and approved only
if it is narrowly tailored to meet compelling state interests.
86. 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980).
87. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9012 (1988).
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A. The Presidential System as Model for Congressional Campaign Reform
Supporters of the S-3 reforms will surely point to the presidential system
as evidence of the constitutionality of the voluntary spending limits S-3
establishes. Under the presidential system, candidates have a choice between
receiving subsidies in exchange for limiting their campaign expenditures, or
foregoing subsidies in exchange for unlimited private fundraising. The
presidential system provides massive public financing-$20 million per
candidate in 1974 dollars-in the general election for candidates who agree not
to incur expenses in excess of fixed aggregate amounts.
88
Judicial precedent concerning the presidential system is relevant but not
dispositive in evaluating whether S-3 imposes unconstitutional conditions on
political candidates. The Supreme Court has not addressed the unconstitutional
conditions argument as it affects the presidential system. Furthermore, the
proposal in S-3 uses the presidential model only as a building block and
deviates significantly from that system.
The best evidence that the Court would extend its Buckley rationale
(upholding the presidential system) to S-3 is a single footnote in the 239-page
decision. In that footnote, the Court stated:
For the reasons discussed in Part III, infra, Congress may engage in
public financing of election campaigns and may condition acceptance
of public funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by
specified expenditure limitations. Just as a candidate may voluntarily
limit the size of the contributions he chooses to accept, he may decide
to forego private fundraising and accept public funding. 9
On its face, the language of this footnote supports voluntary limits, but it
would be foolish to depend solely on this footnote to defend the
constitutionality of the voluntary limits established in S-3. The footnote is
ambiguous and curious: Part III, the section of the Court's opinion analyzing
the presidential system, never addressed Congress' power to condition benefits.
Instead, that section focused on equal-protection concerns raised by third-party
candidates about the eligibility of such candidates for subsidies under the
presidential system. The precedential value of this footnote is weak because the
Court never offered a theory explaining why voluntary limits satisfied
constitutional analysis while mandatory limits did not. Even if that footnote
sufficed as binding precedent for the presidential system, the current plan
involves significant departures from that model.90
88. 26 U.S.C. § 9004 (1988); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b)(1) (1988).
89. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 & n.65.
90. See infra Part IlI.B.
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The ambiguity in Buckley regarding voluntary limits inspired a direct
challenge to the public funding conditions for presidential elections four years
later in Republican National Committee v. Federal Election Commission.91
The plaintiffs asserted the right to raise and spend both private and public
monies without limits even though the use of public funding was designed as
a substitute to private solicitation.' Although the plaintiffs argued that the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions precluded the enforcement of the
spending limits, the district court found these objections unpersuasive. The
district court offered several important justifications for upholding the
presidential system's constitutionality. First, it applied a "coercion" test and
pointed out that each candidate could spend more than the $20 million
provided in public funding by opting out of the system and raising all of the
money privately. "[A]s long as the candidate remains free to engage in
unlimited private funding and spenling instead of limited public funding," the
statute would be valid.93 Second, the court characterized the program not as
requiring the sacrifice of a right but instead as requiring a choice between two
methods of exercising the same right.94 Third, the court ruled that requiring
such a choice was constitutional as long as any diminution of the First
Amendment right was justified by a compelling state interest.9" Applying
these principles, the court ruled that the limits did not infringe upon First
Amendment rights, and that even if they did, the burden would be justified by
the interests advanced by the legislation. Since the Supreme Court merely
affirmed the lower court's decision without rendering an opinion, it is unclear
to what extent the Court would adopt the district court's reasoning. 96
As originally introduced in the 103d Congress, the core of S-3 was
analytically identical to the presidential system. The original bill proposed to
establish a system under which candidates who comply with limits would
receive numerous benefits automatically.97 Although the Senate eventually
eliminated automatic public funding, the measure before the House still relies
heavily on the presidential model. For example, HR-3 would provide all
complying House candidates with matching funds to supplement money raised
91. 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
92. Id. at 283.
93. Id. at 284.
94. Id. at 284-85.
95. Id. at 285 (finding compelling state interest in eliminating reliance on large contributions and
reducing time devoted to fundraising).
96. Opponents of the presidential system point out that because the Supreme Court rendered no
opinion, the district court's determination is less conclusive. See Edward J. Fuhr, The Doctrine of
Unconstitutional Conditions and the First Amendment, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 97, 120 (1989) (citing
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986) as recent example of the Court's revisiting summary
affirmance).




privately98 and provide complying Senate candidates automatically with
communication vouchers equal to twenty percent of the general election
spending limit.99
In order to assess the constitutionality of the presidential model for
congressional campaigns, we must first determine whether the choice presented
to congressional candidates constitutes an offer or a threat. The presidential
system does not present the candidate with a Godfather-style bargain, an offer
she cannot refuse. Actually, she is presented with a choice that expands her
options as a candidate. In choosing between two methods of financing her race,
she will rely on three types of predictions. First, she will attempt to predict the
amount she could raise privately and compare that amount to the amount
provided by the government. If she cannot independently raise the sum
provided by the government, she is more likely to choose the federal grant.
Second, she will predict the decisions of her opponent. An opponent's choice
to raise money privately might indicate his intention to use more expensive
forms of communication and encourage her to forgo public financing. Third,
she will predict the nature of the race confronting her. If she is running against
a well-known incumbent, she might want to raise large amounts early in the
race to compete effectively. Similarly, if she expects a last-minute attack, she
might not want to rely on a bureaucratic agency dispensing funds in a slow
and inefficient manner.
The presidential model does not coerce compliance using threats but
simply makes an offer. Many of these risks might lead a candidate to reject the
benefits package. A candidate who is confident about raising funds above the
ceiling level would not voluntarily cap spending, particularly if she expects a
hotly contested race. Only the candidate who feels pessimistic about her
abilities to raise large sums privately or wants to avoid the opportunity costs
of fundraising will be attracted to public funds. If she accepts the subsidies,
then her speech capabilities should only be enhanced by receipt of the grants.
Most important, no harm accrues to her if she decides to exercise her
constitutional right to make unlimited expenditures. °  By taking the
subsidies, she accepts the government's offer; she does not acquiesce to a
98. H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 121, § 604 (1993). The House measure resembles the
presidential system in that the bill immediately allows complying candidates to receive public funds. More
specifically, the program is similar in that the presidential system subsidizes presidential candidates in the
primaries by matching privately raised donations, moving to full subsidization only in the general election.
99. Id. at see. 101, § 503(a). The House bill includes provisions dealing with Senate elections, but the
current Senate proposal only addresses Senate elections. See supra note 34.
100. Even if her opponent accepts the subsidies and is rendered better off, any harm to her campaign
cannot be said to be the result of her exercise of speech rights. Rather, the opponent is better off as a result
of his own decision to sacrifice speech rights. Clearly, the difficulty of the predictions required by such a
program indicates that incorrect calculations will be made, and thus some speech will be chilled. Edward
Fuhr suggests that such a system places candidates in a prisoner's dilemma, rendering the system
unconstitutional. Fuhr, supra note 96, at 124. He argues that at the outset of a campaign candidates do not
know how best to maximize speech opportunities and will thus choose incorrectly.
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threat. Because the program represents an offer when fashioned in this manner
and does not infringe the First Amendment, there is no need to proceed to the
second analytic step of applying strict scrutiny.
B. Departures from the Presidential System
While the provisions of campaign reform that track the presidential system
should properly survive scrutiny, closer analysis of the current legislation is
required because both the House and Senate versions involve important
departures from that model. First, S-3 and HR-3 condition benefits to an
eligible candidate on a decision by his or her opponent to spend in excess of
the limits. The more the opponent spends, the more broadcast vouchers or cash
subsidies flow to the complying candidate. With the removal from S-3 of
automatic public financing for complying candidates, this triggering mechanism
now constitutes the only public financing in the recently approved Senate Bill.
In HR-3, the triggering mechanism is accompanied by automatic subsidies for
complying candidates.' 0 ' Second, S-3 and HR-3 require that Senate
candidates who do not comply with the limits run a disclaimer on their
advertisements announcing that the candidate does not abide by spending
limits.' Third, the Senate has chosen to finance the cost of S-3 by requiring
the campaign of the noncomplying candidate to pay taxes on her campaign
funds at the highest corporate rate. 03
All three provisions are designed to reduce the burden campaign reform
that places on the taxpayer. Although the presidential system has enjoyed
relative success in reducing the influence of private donors, its high costs have
rendered it politically nonviable as a total solution to campaign finance
reform."°4 Elizabeth Drew writes:
[L]eaders in the reform fight-on Capitol Hill and in outside
groups-have concluded that such extensive public financing is a
political no-sale, and back instead partial financing .... In this day
of extreme skepticism of politicians, in this Era of Rush Limbaugh,
members of Congress don't feel that they can explain to the public
why the taxpayers should be paying for their elections, even though
that would end up saving taxpayers' money.'05
101. The triggering provisions are discussed infra Part III.B.I.
102. The disclaimer provision is discussed infra Part III.B.2.
103. The taxing mechanism is discussed infra Part nI.B.3.
104. Only 35 Senators voted for a substitute amendment that would have provided for 90% public
financing of congressional campaigns paid for by an elimination of the tax deduction for lobbying expenses
and a $5 check-off on tax returns similar to the check-off used in presidential elections. 51 CONG. Q. 1389
(1993) (Vote no. 130).
105. Elizabeth Drew, Watch 'Em Squirm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, § 6 (Magazine), at 74 (pointing
out that public financing would ultimately save money because wealthy contributors could not use their
influence later to win tax loopholes).
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As Congress struggles with the constitutional obstacles of Buckley, it must also
satisfy taxpayer concerns. However, these efforts only work to compound the
constitutional problems associated with evading Buckley's prohibition on
mandatory limits. Under the microscope of the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, the triggering mechanism should survive scrutiny, but, as currently
drafted, the disclaimer and the taxing mechanism violate the First Amendment.
1. Triggered Subsidies
One of the greatest innovations of the current campaign finance reform
plan is to provide contingency financing to eligible candidates when a free-
spending opponent surpasses the voluntary limits. Triggered benefits induce
compliance at less cost than total subsidization because the benefits are held
in abeyance until one candidate surpasses the ceiling. Under HR-3, candidates
for the House of Representatives would be eligible to receive "contingency
money" in the form of unlimited matching funds once their opponents exceed
eighty percent of the campaign spending ceiling.10 6 Furthermore, eligible
House candidates would receive matching funds if their opponents' supporters
make independent expenditures above $10,000 t07 and triple matching funds
if their opponents contribute over $300,000 of their own money to their
campaigns. 08 For Senate races, S-3 contemplates awards in the form of
federal vouchers for mail and broadcast advertisements up to an amount
equivalent to the state spending limit.'09 When a noncomplying opponent
surpasses the ceiling, the eligible candidate wins a grant equal to one-third of
the general election limit."0 If an opponent exceeds the limit by more than
one-third but less than two-thirds, the complying candidate receives another
one-third grant, bringing the total subsidy to 66% of the statutory limit."' If
the free-spending candidate exceeds the limit by more than two-thirds, the
federal subsidy would amount to an aggregate additional gift of 100% of the
value of the spending limit." 2 Finally, if a free-spending candidate expends
more than twice the limit, not only would complying candidates get subsidies
worth the limit but they would also be allowed to raise additional funds equal
to the spending limit."3 Conceivably, an eligible candidate could raise and
106. H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 121 § 601(a)(2)(B) (1993).
107. Id. §§ 603-04. Independent expenditures are those made by groups or individuals other than the
parties seeking elective office but which have a vested interest in the outcome of the race.
108. Id. § 603(e)(3).
109. S. 3 as Passed, supra note 40, sec. 101, § 503. The state spending limit is determined by a
formula dependent upon the voting age population. The maximum limit for a Senate candidate in a general
election is $5.5 million. Id. § 502.
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spend three times the amount calculated to be a fair spending limit based on
voting-age population.'
4
a. Triggered Benefits Are Coercive
Although triggered benefits are designed to ensure compliance with the
voluntary limits at minimum cost to the government, they also accentuate the
compulsion problem by directly tying the amount of benefits given to one
candidate to the amount of constitutionally protected expenditures by that
candidate's opponent. Given the competitive context in which elections take
place, lawmakers have concluded that the prospect of assisting one's opponent
will encourage candidates to abide by the statutory ceilings." 5 Theoretically,
the candidate will eschew an excess expenditure in light of the significant
financial benefits that would flow to the opponent. The provision is therefore
based on the premise that the candidate will forgo an expenditure she would
have made had the legislation not been in place. In this way, the candidate
who would otherwise exercise her First Amendment rights under Buckley will
be deterred from exercising them to the full extent she desires.
Notwithstanding the congressional assumption that the trigger will serve
as an effective deterrent, some candidates will undoubtedly spend resources
regardless of the benefits that flow to their opponents. For these candidates,
costs imposed by the program are worth the advantage gained by excessive
campaign expenditures. Despite this self-interested calculation, a candidate
deciding to make the excess expenditure is still disadvantaged by the benefits
conferred on the opponent. Imagine a candidate whose spending is just below
the limit when her opponent launches an attack in a television commercial. The
candidate responds, but in so doing, exceeds the limit and arms the opponent
with the funds to level a second attack. In such a situation, Buckley is clearly
implicated because the triggered benefits reduce the prospects of electoral
success when the right to make unlimited expenditures is exercised."6
Although the Constitution does not secure a right to remain competitive in an
election campaign, the Constitution should be invoked to scrutinize
government's efforts to punish an individual choosing to exercise a protected
right.
114. In all, the eligible candidate could spend: privately raised funds up to the ceiling; public funds
equal to the ceiling provided through the triggering mechanism; and additional private funds equal to the
ceiling if the free-spending candidate spends more than twice the limit.
115. The legislation relies on the assumption that the set of incentives and disincentives will result in
"voluntary" acceptance of the statutory ceilings.
116. A less sympathetic example gives rise to the same concern. A very wealthy candidate may refuse
to limit expenditures even though this choice triggers benefits to her opponent. However, the fact that
some candidates decide it is in their own interests to continue to spend without limit does not mean they
are not placed in a worse-off position than before the program was established.
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The dynamic created by the triggered benefits plan should be distinguished
from that established by the presidential system. It is true that a presidential
candidate who chooses to rely only on private fundraising is at a disadvantage
compared to an opponent who is fully subsidized by the government. The
subsidized candidate, for example, can devote significantly more time to
contacting voters and pursuing a strategy unencumbered by fundraising
demands. In that way, one might argue that the nonparticipating candidate is
made worse off by the program. However, the benefits the subsidized
candidate receives do not depend on the spending decisions of the
noncomplying candidate but flow in the same amount regardless of the
noncomplying candidate's exercise of speech rights. Whether a noncomplying
presidential candidate spends $100 or $100 million, her opponent receives the
same subsidy. In the triggered benefits regime, however, an opponent's
benefits are tied directly to the level of speech of the noncomplying candidates.
If the noncomplying candidate exercises her Buckley right to exceed the limit,
the complying candidate will receive a large public subsidy. For the
noncomplying candidate, her choice to exercise her Buckley liberties directly
strengthens the opponent's political campaign and correspondingly reduces her
own prospects of electoral success. Thus, triggered benefits are coercive and
should be subjected to strict scrutiny.
b. Applying Strict Scrutiny
Although these provisions coerce compliance, they should be approved
because they are narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.
Currently, no "purposes" section exists in the House and Senate versions of
campaign reform legislation. However, the bill's Senate sponsor articulated
several goals of this most recent reform effort: 1) eliminating the corrupting
influence of excessive spending on the legislative process; 2) equalizing the
influence of constituents; 3) making public office more accessible to new
candidates by reducing the cost of campaigns; 4) enabling members of
Congress to devote more time to problem solving and official business, rather
than to the constant chase for campaign finances; and 5) reinvigorating the
democratic process by making grassroots participation matter in election
outcomes.' 17
117. The bill's author, Senator David Boren, articulated these interests on the day the bill was
introduced. 139 CONG. REC. S224, S224-25 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993) (statement of Sen. Boren). The
legislation passed by the 102d Congress did not specifically set forth legislative purposes. Campaign reform
activist Roland Hornet, Jr. suggests that a purposes section be added to the bill itself. Homet would add
the purposes to (1) "strengthen and facilitate full and free campaign discussion and debate"; (2) "relieve
office seekers and holders from undue fundraising distractions that impede development and pursuit of
national policy objectives"; and (3) "limit corruption and undue influence, or the appearance thereof, in the
financing of national campaigns." Roland S. Homet, Jr., Illustrative Provisions of Campaign Finance
Reform: Challenging Buckley v. Valeo 6 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (presented
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The Buckley Court recognized the elimination of corruption as the sole
justification for campaign speech restrictions and argued that contribution
limits would suffice to curb the risk of corruption. The Court held:
The major evil associated with rapidly increasing campaign
expenditures is the danger of candidate dependence on large
contributions. The interest in alleviating the corrupting influence of
large contributors is served by the Act's contribution limitations....
The Court of Appeals' assertion that the expenditure restrictions are
necessary to reduce the incentive to circumvent direct contribution
limits is not persuasive."8
By declaring contribution limits the solution to candidate dependence on
fundraising, the Court focused only on a quid pro quo notion of corruption,
i.e., the problem posed by dollars given in return for political favors.
The Court's declaration that contribution limits alone would end such
abuse was, in retrospect, naive. 119 As a result of the rising costs of
campaigns, contribution limits have proven ineffective because candidates more
than ever have become dependent on large contributors to remain financially
competitive. Not only have costs increased dramatically, but wealthy donors
have found numerous ways to circumvent the Act's limits. 20 Without some
form of comprehensive spending ceilings, candidates and their contributors will
always exploit the limited regulations governing contributions in order to
amass huge sums. Spending limits control the overall amount of money
flowing into the system, whereas contribution limits only affect the size of
individual donations.
at Consultation on Buckley v. Valeo on Apr. 19, 1993 in Washington, D.C.).
118. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79-80.
119. In Buckley the Court had no factual record before it for this proposition but still determined that
contribution limits would suffice as a reform instrument. Seventeen years later, finance reform advocates
must make their case through legislative findings and briefs before the Court to broaden the notion of
corruption but also to demonstrate the strong relationship between money spent and success in winning
office.
120. "Soft money" provides one common way to subvert contribution limits and has been used widely
to funnel massive contributions to presidential candidates, despite the existence of contribution limits. Soft
money includes funds not subject to federal limitation, such as contributions to state political parties that
are particularly important to a federal candidate. These contributions often exceed $100,000 and are
designed specifically to circumvent the 1974 law. According to some observers, private money in the form
of "soft money" contributions has effectively thwarted the intent of the 1974 Act. See Drew, supra note
105, at 33. Current campaign reform legislation attempts to deal with soft money by counting all benefits
accruing to a federal candidate, whether or not derived from state party spending, against the candidate's
spending limit.
The "bundling" of numerous contributions by well-connected individuals who solicit potential donors
comprising a single interest group has become one of the most popular devices for funneling massive
resources to a particular candidate and evading the strictures of the 1974 Act. The new reform legislation
prohibits bundling by all political action committees, trade associations, lobbyists, corporate or union
officers, and their employees. S. 3 as Passed. supra note 40, § 401 (a) (amending 2 U.S.C. 441 (a)(8)). These
provisions will also most likely come under fire on grounds of free speech and associational rights.




Moreover, courts should broaden their conception of corruption to account
for the erosion of public confidence in the integrity of the campaign process.
Indeed, the public increasingly has become dissatisfied with the political
process, concluding that the system is unresponsive to the average citizen and
captured by interest groups capable of making large campaign contributions.
After interviewing hundreds of citizens across the nation, one academic study
concluded:
People believe two forces have corrupted democracy. The first is that
lobbyists have replaced representatives as the primary political actors.
The other force, seen as more pernicious, is that campaign
contributions seem to determine political outcomes more than voting.
No accusation cuts deeper because when money and privilege replace
votes, the social contract underlying the political system is abrogated.
Influenced by this widespread perception, people decide that voting
doesn't really count anymore-so why bother.'2'
Spending limits would effectively combat this type of corruption, first, by
stemming the demand for money from special interests that wield
disproportionate financial clout. The perception of excessive special interest
power is a major factor in the public's low confidence in the electoral
system.' 22 Second, reduced spending in congressional races would help
eliminate incumbents' enormous fundraising advantages and thereby provoke
more challengers to enter the political process. Incumbents, particularly those
with key committee posts, receive far and away the most campaign
contributions, leading to a remarkably high reelection rate.'23 In 1992, Senate
incumbents outspent challengers in twenty-six out of twenty-seven races,
winning eighty-six percent of those races.' 24 Similarly, 306 of 313 House
incumbents outspent their challengers, winning reelection at a rate of ninety-
three percent.'1s Third, spending limits would increase legislative efficiency
by decreasing the amount of time dedicated by members of Congress to
fundraising rather than governing.'2 6 Finally, the public overwhelmingly
121. David Mathews, Foreword to KE=rERING FOUNDATION, CmZENS AND POLrICS; A VIEW FROM
MAIN STREET AMERICA at v (1991) (report prepared by the Harwood Group).
122. See Dan Balz, Report Finds Americans Angry at Political System, WASH. POST, June 5, 1991,
at A4 (discussing report issued by Kettering Foundation asserting that citizens feel "locked out" of system
controlled by monied interests and politicians).
123. In the first six months of his tenure as chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) received almost $100,000 in contributions from organizations that had never
before given to his campaign. Chairmanship of Key Senate Panel Is Worth Big Money, NEWHOUSE NEvs
SERV., Sept. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
124. Figures provided by Common Cause, Washington, D.C. (on file with author).
125. Id.
126. The Court in Buckley recognized a similar advantage in establishing public funding for
presidential candidates. The Court stated, "Congress properly regarded public financing as an appropriate
means of relieving major-party Presidential candidates from the rigors of soliciting private contributions."
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supports spending limits for congressional campaigns as a device to reduce the
role played by money in deciding elections.' 27
In addition to assisting Congress in accomplishing its anti-corruption
objectives, triggered benefits would have a minimal impact on speech rights,
thus satisfying the requirement that the restrictions be narrowly tailored.
Indeed, expenditure limits, when coupled with public grants, would enhance
rather than inhibit public debate. The benefits accrue to the complying
candidate only after the noncomplying candidate has exceeded generous limits.
The ceilings allow for maximum spending of approximately $5.5 minion for
certain Senate general elections 8 and $600,000 for House elections.
2 9
Both of these amounts surpass the average sums presently spent in
congressional elections. The speech value of expenditures beyond this point
reflects diminishing returns, contributing more to distortion and drowning out
of discussion than to meaningful debate.130 While this assertion presents a
clear challenge to Buckley's equation of money and speech, the Court should
respect legislative expertise in determining the spending amounts sufficient for
robust political debate.
Buckley's money-as-speech equation is a blunt instrument, vulnerable to
critique and ripe for refinement. First, at high levels of expenditures, additional
campaign spending often is repetitive, designed to saturate the market rather
than to discuss public issues. After each election, particularly the 1988 Bush-
Dukakis race, dissatisfaction with the quality of paid political speech has been
rampant.13 ' In the 1992 election, the most satisfying discussions typically
took place in far less expensive fora such as debate formats or talk shows
rather than in traditional paid commercial advertising. 32 Second, it is well
established that a high percentage of money is raised not for speech purposes
but rather to frighten off competition from would-be challengers. 33 This
war-chest-building inhibits debate and effectively secures an incumbent's
reelection before the filing date for candidates is even officially opened. While
a war chest sends a strong signal of political power, it hardly deserves
424 U.S. at 96.
127. Celinda Lake & Steve Cobble, Money Talks: A Survey and Focus Groups of National Opinion
on Campaign Finance Reform 5 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Mellman, Lazarus, Lake, Inc.,
Washington, D.C.) (data reflects 86% support for spending limits).
128. S. 3 as Passed, supra note 40, sec. 101, § 502(b).
129. H.R. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 121, § 604(a) (1993).
130. Lake & Cobble, supra note 127, at 5. Along with levelling the playing field among candidates,
the public believes spending limits would reduce "mudslinging" and that the current electoral finance
system creates campaign periods that are too long. Id.
131. See generally Jeffrey A. Levinson, Note, An Informed Electorate: Requiring Broadcasters to
Provide Free Airtime to Candidates for Public Office, 72 B.U. L. REV. 143, 146-47 (1992) (citing
numerous examples in 1992 presidential election of using paid campaign advertising to avoid substantive
issues).
132. See Renee Loth, Campaign Ads Lost Their Primacy Among Political Weapons, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 7, 1992, at 6.
133. FRrrz & MORRIS, supra note 29, at 8 (noting that in 1990 unopposed House members raised and
spent on average more than $250,000 and unopposed Senators spent average of $668,000).
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protection as expressive activity. Certainly, it has nothing to do with a First
Amendment understood as "a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open ....
To the contrary, these war chests enable most incumbent members of Congress
to "create their own state-of-the-art, permanent political machine[s]. ' , 135 To
deter competition, a candidate need not even spend the funds; even when the
money is spent, it often goes to purposes largely unrelated to political speech.
In 1990, for example, Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) spent $733,000 from
his campaign coffers to pay for college scholarships. 136 Third, a significant
percentage of funds raised are devoted to managing the enormous
bureaucracies of the modem campaign rather than to promoting speech. Nearly
half of all campaign expenditures are used for "nonspeech" purposes, such as
administrative functions, entertainment, and overhead. 137 The typical staff
includes personnel for administration, opposition research, and data
collection. 138  More and more campaign expenditures are used for
sophisticated voter identification procedures and highly targeted get-out-the-
vote drives. 139 Justice White recognized the bureaucratic component of
political campaigns long ago in his dissent to Buckley. 140 Time has only
increased the amount, as well as the percentage, of funds used to maintain
these bureaucracies.'
14
Opponents of spending limits point to the fact that limits, by their nature,
inhibit debate. For them, the rise in spending is a sign of a vital democracy,
and campaign expenditure limits only hinder political discussion. Indeed,
numerous Senate and House candidates would have been precluded from
spending the sums of money spent in the 1992 elections had the bill been in
134. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). To the extent that public debate is
impoverished by war chests that discourage challengers and stifle competition, it seems perverse to allow
the First Amendment to protect such practices from reform. See Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1407 (1986).
135. Sarah Fritz, Where We Actually Need Real Reform: Campaign Spending, ROLL CALL, Aug. 3,
1992, at 5.
136. FRITZ & MORRIS, supra note 29, at 9.
137. Id. at 2, 42. Detailed examination of the 1990 congressional campaigns reveals that more than
half of all the money spent had almost no relationship to contacting voters. In fact, members of Congress
spent almost $4 million in 1990 simply sending gifts, such as flowers or holiday cards, to constituents. Id.
138. In the 1990 campaign, overhead consumed almost $108 million or 26% of campaign expenditures
for congressional candidates. Id. at 28.
139. Id. at 104. An entire industry of political consultants has developed since the 1970's, with
specialties ranging from experts on management techniques to polling, fundraising, and direct mail. In the
1990 election cycle, congressional candidates spent more than $188 million on consultants, 45% of total
expenditures, over $50 million of which was used for polling and fundraising.
140. White wrote, "[Many expensive campaign activities.., are ... not themselves communicative
or remotely related to speech. Furthermore, campaigns differ among themselves. Some seem to spend much
less money than others and yet communicate as much as or more than those supported by enormous
bureaucracies with unlimited financing." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 263.
141. The Senate campaign of Bill Bradley (D-N.J.) in 1990 spent nearly $251,000 on phone calls,
$225,986 to buy a computer and terminals, and $171,000 for software licenses. FRrrz & MORRIS, supra
note 29, at 30-31. The campaign spent $263,601 on rent and utilities, and $384,659 on office supplies and
furniture. Id. at 36.
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effect. 42 However, the triggered benefits, unlike mandatory caps, enable
spending to occur far in excess of the amounts set forth by Congress as
sufficient for a healthy political battle. A noncomplying candidate's decision
to make additional expenditures would enhance public debate, since public
funds would be provided to facilitate any response by an eligible politician. In
certain circumstances, the regulatory program would license expenditures at a




S-3 also requires all Senate candidates who do not comply with voluntary
limits to reveal their noncompliance by disclaimers on all advertising.' 44 The
Act states:
If a broadcast, cablecast, or other communication is paid for or
authorized by a candidate in the general election for the office of
United States Senator who is not an eligible Senate candidate...
such communication shall contain the following sentence: "This
candidate has not agreed to voluntary campaign spending limits.
,1 45
a. The Disclaimer Is Coercive
While a disclaimer is not a criminal fine, its purpose is to impose stigmatic
harm. In this way, the provision renders the candidate making expenditures,
which are constitutionally protected by Buckley, worse off than the candidate
would have been had the program never existed. Animating the disclaimer
requirement is the belief that the public will draw the negative inference from
the advertisement that the candidate has violated some ethical norm, has
become captive to special interests, or even worse, has engaged in conduct that
violates election laws. The provision's purpose to impose stigmatic harm is
apparent in light of the preexisting requirement that candidates disclose all but
de minimis expenditures and contributions to the Federal Election
Commission. 46 This prior disclosure defeats any right-to-know objective in
the provision since it is already a matter of public record that the candidate has
exceeded the ceilings. Those who defy the voluntary limits are saddled with
142. According to an extensive study by Congressional Quarterly, nearly one-half of all candidates
for Congress spent above the limits established in the campaign reform bill. One hundred eighty candidates
exceeded the $600,000 spending ceilings that the Democratic bill would set on House candidates. Thirty-
two Senate candidates exceeded the bill's state spending caps. Beth Donovan, '92 Numbers Suggest Big
Changes If Campaign Finance Bill Passes, 51 CONG. Q. 436 (1993).
143. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
144. S. 3 as Passed, supra note 40, § 104 (amending 2 U.S.C. 441(d)).
145. Id.
146. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-434 (1988).
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the disclaimer and rendered worse off in light of the stigma attached to the
exercise of First Amendment rights. 47
Moreover, the disclaimer is particularly burdensome given the brief time
span television advertisements afford most candidates to deliver their message.
Candidates are already required to disclose in all advertisements the name of
the political organization that purchased the advertising time.148 The added
disclaimer could take up as much as twenty percent of the commonly used
fifteen-second television spot, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of the
candidate's political speech. This imposition, like the stigmatic harm, is a
burden that must be justified under strict-scrutiny analysis because it will
coerce many candidates into accepting the limits.
b. Applying Strict Scrutiny
Although the disclaimer does induce compliance with the spending limits,
and therefore furthers compelling governmental interests in fighting corruption,
the disclaimer is not narrowly tailored to the objectives of reducing corruption
or of enhancing speech. First, the disclaimer is overbroad: it attaches to .all
advertisements purchased by an ineligible candidate, beginning with the first
dollar of the election campaign. A candidate who refuses to file a declaration
with the Secretary of the Senate pledging compliance with the program would
have to broadcast the disclaimer even on advertisements made with
expenditures below the statutory ceiling.'49 Congress could have limited the
disclaimer requirement to candidates who exceed the spending limits, but
instead imposed this sanction for failing even to promise compliance.
Second, the provision provides no corresponding benefit to public debate.
Unlike triggered benefits, which enable poorly funded candidates to get access
to media sources, the main effect of the disclaimer would simply be to
embarrass those candidates exercising their First Amendment rights. Rather
than adding to public discussion, the disclaimer will deter political
advertisements and thereby hinder public debate. Even if the commercial is
aired, the disclaimer required by the provision will take up time that would
otherwise have been devoted to expressing the campaign message.
Although reformers will argue that the disclaimer serves a third objective,
the public's right to know, this argument is undermined by the fact that the
provision does not require all candidates to disclose the choices made under
147. Because the added language directly changes the campaign message advanced by the candidate,
the disclaimer will also face challenge as a content regulation, a violation of one of the most longstanding
norms in First Amendment jurisprudence. See HARRY J. KALVEN JR., A vORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM
OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 235 (1988). The provision is unlike disclaimers characterizing the commercial
speech context because it affects the more protected sphere of political speech and is not based on the
accepted deception-prevention rationale of commercial speech disclaimers.
148. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1988).
149. S. 3 as Passed, supra note 40, sec. 101, § 501(b).
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S-3. Instead, the provision is underinclusive, singling out the noncomplying
candidate's decision not to curtail spending but neglecting to disclose the
complying candidate's decision to accept public funds. 50 If the legislation
were truly designed to further the right to know, it would require all candidates
to declare their choices regarding acceptance of public funds or reliance on
private fundraising.
3. The Tax Exemption for Complying Candidates
Along with radically scaling back the public funding included in S-3 to
win Senate passage, lawmakers worked out a financing mechanism that will
surely sound alarm bells in the courts5.' The Senate Bill removes an existing
tax exemption for campaigns and thereby imposes the highest corporate tax
rate on the campaign treasuries of candidates who refuse to comply with the
limits. 52 The funds from this tax would pay for communication vouchers and
other benefits flowing to complying candidates for their television and postal
advertising when they face opponents who exceed the statutory ceilings. Before
this provision passed, one Senator stated:
[A]s a crown of shame to this offensive legislation, the Senate last
night added an amendment which would impose a tax on candidates
who exercise their first amendment right to refuse taxpayers' subsidies
and to speak freely. . . . [O]ne can only imagine where such [a]
legislative concept could take us in terms of taxing other speech
which we found objectionable for one reason or another.1
53
a. The Exemption Policy Is Coercive
The funding mechanism acts as a threat because it places a person
choosing to spend beyond the limits in a worse position than if the program
150. By a vote of 47-45, the Senate defeated an amendment that sought to embarrass complying
candidates who accepted the federally-funded vouchers for their advertisements. The amendment would
have required campaign commercials paid for by vouchers to include a disclaimer stating that "the
preceding political advertisement was paid for with taxpayer funds." 51 CONG. Q. 1511 (1993) (Vote no.
140).
151. The House bill does not contain a provision specifying the source of the public funding.
Similarly, the legislation passed in the last Congress did not specify a funding source because lawmakers
wanted to wait to see whether the plan would be vetoed before making the controversial decision of how
to pay for it. Ultimately, Congress' failure to override President Bush's veto made the funding
determination unnecessary.
152. S. 3 as Passed, supra note 40, sec. 101, § 510(a). The bill creates the Senate Election Campaign
Fund to be funded by:
Amounts received in the Treasury which are equivalent to the increase in Federal revenues by
reason of the repeal of the exempt function income exclusion under Section 527 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986... for the principal campaign committee, of any candidate who does
not abide by the campaign expenditure limits under this title ....
Id. No such provision exists in the House bill.
153. 139 CONG. REc. S7408 (daily ed. June 17, 1993) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
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had never been offered in the first place. The harm is direct and concrete: the
tax requires the noncomplying Senate candidate to raise, on the average, almost
$2.5 million in additional funds to remain on an even playing field with the
complying candidate.
154
The coercive nature of the tax is not changed by the fact that the charge
derives from the removal of an exemption rather than the imposition of a new
tax. The Court has long recognized that the denial of an existing benefit can
constitute a penalty sufficient to establish an unconstitutional condition. In
Speiser,155 for example, Justice Brennan recognized that it was improper to
remove a property tax exemption only for those veterans who agreed to take
a loyalty oath: "To deny an exemption for claimants who engage in certain
forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech."'
56
Given the tax exemption historically provided to campaigns, the exemption
policy established in the reform program is better described as a penalty for
noncompliance than as a bonus for compliance. If the exemption had never
been provided before, an exemption for complying candidates might be
justified as an award. 57 However, the tax exemption for political committees
has long been a defining feature of election law.t15 Congress codified the
exemption in 1974 only after the Internal Revenue Service indicated that it
planned to begin treating campaign committees as taxable entities. 159 By not
154. If the average successful Senate campaign costs $4.2 million, then a noncomplying candidate
would have to raise more than $6.6 million in order to meet that average after a corporate tax of thirty-four
percent was imposed.
155. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
156. Id. at 518; see also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1986) (holding that
denial of tax exemption to limited number of publications constituted infringement of free speech);
Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Rev., 460 U.S. 575, (1983) (holding that partial tax
exemption acted as penalty on certain class of newspapers in violation of First Amendment). But cf. Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (holding that New York City's tax exemption for religious
organizations did not violate Establishment Clause because exemption only creates minimal involvement
between church and state).
157. The insight that losing a benefit is more traumatic than not receiving a benefit in the first place
has been noted by philosophers, psychologists, and legal commentators. See, e.g., Jack L. Knetsch, The
Endowment Effect & Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 1277, 1282
(1989); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871-72 (1982) (holding that while school board did not have
discretion to remove book found to be objectionable, board retained wide latitude in adding books to
library), The prospective effect of the exemption also heightens the coercion problem. As candidates
respond to the inducements established in the legislation, S-3 will burden an ever-diminishing number of
candidates with the tax. Ideally, only a small group of hold-outs will be denied the exemption and pay the
fine for refusing to cap expenditures. Where only a small number of entities are actually denied the benefit,
one may more likely infer that the purpose of the exemption policy is to penalize a select few. In
Minneapolis Star & Tribune, 460 U.S. at 591, the Court noted that the effect of the exemption was to
subject only a handful of similarly situated newspapers to the tax, thereby heightening concern that the tax
represented an improper penalty on protected speech. See also Kreimer, supra note 45, at 1363-71.
158. I.R.C. § 527 (1993). Section 527(e) extends limited tax-exempt status to political organizations,
which include political parties, campaign committees, and political action committees involved in
influencing election outcomes. I.R.C. § 527(e).
159. Laura B. Chisolm, Sinking the Think Tanks Upstream: The Use and Misuse of Tax Exemption
Law to Address the Use and Misuse of Tax-Exempt Organizations by Politicians, 51 U. Prrr. L. REv. 577,
586 n.43 (1990).
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complying with the limits, the candidates paying the tax are burdened with a
new financial obligation and suffer a loss.'
60
b. Applying Strict Scrutiny
From a political standpoint, the formulation and passage of the
noncompliance tax was a master stroke. Without this provision, no campaign
reform bill would have passed the Senate, and therefore no public funding
would have been established for campaigns. The campaign tax amendment
gutted S-3 of funding from the general treasury and thereby garnered the
support of seven Republicans necessary to end a week-long filibuster waged
against the bill.'
6'
Despite its political necessity and its utility in enforcing the limits
established by Congress, the tax is not narrowly tailored. First, the tax does not
apply solely to resources above the ceilings but also applies to funds raised
below the statutory amounts, penalizing expenditures under those levels found
by Congress to undermine public confidence in the electoral process. Second,
the tax is not progressive but is applied at the highest corporate rate. It
therefore burdens poorly funded candidates who refuse to comply for
ideological reasons as much as it does wealthy candidates who, without regard
to ideology, spend far in excess of the statutory limits. Finally, the Senate
could have chosen a less burdensome approach such as funding the program
out of general revenues or through the mechanism used in the presidential plan
where taxpayers check off a small amount on their annual returns to fund the
system. 62
To its credit, the Senate carefully circumscribed the use of money from the
fund, ensuring that the funds raised would be used to finance the speech
enhancement aspects of the bill. S-3 states that the account "shall be available
only for the purposes of... providing benefits under this title... and making
expenditures in connection with the administration of the Fund."' 163 In this
way, the tax dispenses speech benefits in the same manner as the triggered
benefits, simultaneously deterring some expenditures while encouraging others.
Were it not for the overbreadth problems discussed above, the tax provision
could survive scrutiny as long as the Court expanded Buckley's notion of
corruption and recognized that at astronomical levels of campaign spending,
expenditures no longer have the same speech value.' 64 In subsequent
160. See Kreimer, supra note 45, at 1359-63 (describing use of history as baseline to distinguish
between offers and threats in certain circumstances).
161. Beth Donovan, Senate Passes Campaign Finance by Gutting Public Funding, 51 CONG. Q. 1533
(1993).
162. I.R.C. § 6096 (1993).
163. S. 3 as Passed, supra note 40, sec. 101, § 510(a)(4).
164. See supra Part IfI.B.l.b.
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drafting, reform advocates should make the tax applicable only to above-
ceiling expenditures and make it more progressive. Otherwise, the public
funding generated from the tax will be highly vulnerable to attack on First
Amendment grounds, jeopardizing a fundamental aspect of meaningful
campaign reform.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the Supreme Court's hostility to regulation of political speech, it is
difficult to predict how the campaign reform legislation will fare in the legal
battle that will follow its passage. Whether or not the program remains
securely in the zone of constitutionality created by Buckley depends largely on
the amount and source of public funds devoted to the program. The Court
would almost certainly approve those aspects of the Bill that mimic the offer
permitted in the presidential campaign finance system. However, some of the
major departures from that model use coercion to induce compliance, and
thereby raise serious problems under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions.
Despite its attempt to slip by the obstacles presented by Buckley, Congress
has crafted a proposal that can only survive if the Court moves beyond a quid
pro quo concept of corruption, recognizing public confidence in democratic
integrity as a compelling government interest, and retreats from its theory that
all money equals speech. If the Court refines these two Buckley notions, it may
salvage the triggering mechanism used in the plan. Even with these changes,
the Court will likely hold the disclaimer unconstitutional as an overly broad
coercive device and reject the noncompliance tax unless modified.
If Congress eliminates all vestiges of the presidential system in order to
reduce the cost of the legislation, the Court could invalidate a reform agenda
that has taken over nineteen years to piece together. At the same time, these
departures from the presidential model will enable the Court to rethink key
aspects of Buckley that have needlessly stymied reform efforts until now. No
matter what the final shape of the legislation, Congress' return to the
courthouse steps demonstrates lingering dissatisfaction with electoral law, a
sentiment reflected also in the public at large. Ideally, the dialogue between
Congress and the Court will result in a balance, which recognizes the threat of
corruption posed by the skyrocketing cost of campaigns yet avoids using
government benefits improperly to punish exercise of First Amendment rights.
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